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Each year, first-year law students are introduced to the study of
law through the case method. The minds of future lawyers are
sharpened by considering the misfortune of the fellow with chest hair
on his palm;1 the people chasing each others’ foxes through the forest;2 the dimwitted brothers seeking to farm the Oklahoma hardscrabble;3 or the individuals who, unable to make monthly installment payments on their home appliances, appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court for relief.4 While the claims of injustice are real, there is
scant attention paid to the puzzling issue of why these individuals
and organizations would give of their time and money to litigate
cases to judgment and opinion, and thereby provide such a rich
source of teaching material. What’s more, these valiant contributors
to the education of law students seek no compensation for their efforts, demand no copyright in the product created, and claim no protection against the snickers and guffaws that inevitably accompany
the repeated recitation of their misfortune.
Even more peculiar is the fact that as soon as disputants enter the
litigation process, they are clear losers. Whatever the stakes in a dispute between two parties, there is only one way in which they can
preserve their joint welfare. Any division of the stake between them,
whether it be one side taking all, or half-and-half, or anything in between, leaves the parties jointly in the same position as when they
began their dispute: however they slice it, they will still have the entire pie to share. It is only by bringing lawyers into the mix and by
* Harold R. Medina Professor in Procedural Jurisprudence, Columbia Law School.
This article was originally presented as the 2000 Mason Ladd Lecture at the Florida State
University College of Law on March 13, 2000. My thanks to Mark Seidenfeld and my generous hosts at the College of Law. Special thanks to my research assistants Greg Diamond,
Dina Hamerman, and Todd Lundell.
1. Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114 (1929).
2. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (1805).
3. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
4. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972).
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subjecting themselves to the inevitable costs of litigation that the
parties consign themselves to being worse off. Once lawyers and
courts and filing fees and witnesses and depositions and all the rest
are brought into the picture, the pie starts getting smaller and
smaller. Because this is perfectly obvious, and perfectly obvious to all
rational disputants right from the get go, the penchant of our casebook warriors to litigate requires some explanation.
The explanation cannot be found simply in the short-sightedness
of the disputants. Even if it were not perfectly clear at the very beginning that a trip through the litigation minefield is costly, that lesson is soon brought home to litigants. Regardless of the contractual
terms with their attorneys and even if represented on a contingency,
clients soon realize that they are signing away a significant amount
of resources to their newly acquired legal representatives. Most parties quickly learn this lesson and a remarkably stable ninety-five
percent of cases manage to get resolved well short of trial.5 But five
percent or so do manage to make it to court, and some persist in going on to appeal. What accounts for these volunteer heroes of subsequent legal instruction?
The point of departure for considering this issue could be the prevailing understanding of two or so generations ago. At a time when
the question of why cases were fought to conclusion was not considered pressing, the common metaphor for explaining disputes that
went to trial was that they were as rare and random as lightning
strikes. But just as our understanding of the physics of lightning
changed over time to where we now understand that swinging a golf
club in an exposed field during a thunderstorm can affect one’s
chances of making the evening news, so too our legal intuitions have
advanced a bit. My goal in this essay is to both sketch a part of our
emerging understanding of why cases actually litigate and of some of
the limitations of that understanding. To do so, I first present a
streamlined explanation of the first major improvement in our understanding, the law and economics model of why cases are litigated.
I then present the limitations that this model faces in accounting for
the actual choices of human beings.
I. THE LAW AND ECONOMICS MODEL
Law and economics draws from the pioneering work of Nobel Laureate Gary Becker of the University of Chicago and is important as
5. Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternate Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 818, 820 (1988) (noting that an estimated ninety-five percent of all civil cases are settled before trial); Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal
Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 269 (1984) (“Something like 90 percent of civil cases are
settled . . . .”).
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the first coherent view of why cases reach and travel through the
process of litigation. It provides insight into what is likeliest the central paradox of litigation: the fact that taken together, the parties to
a lawsuit are losers from the moment they enter the process of adjudication. Becker’s insight was that the neoclassical economic model of
“marginal trade-offs” could be applied with success (if not always the
same degree of it) to less clearly economic decisions made in the domains of criminality, love, marriage, and law.6 An unexpectedly
broad range of behaviors could be explained by the discounted utility
that individuals could expect to achieve from among a set of alternatives. Why do some individuals engage in criminal activity while others do not? An answer might be found in the likely trade-offs between
the risk of getting caught and the opportunities foregone if one or another person might have to spend time incarcerated.7 Why do people
marry? Love may be part of the answer, but so are the search costs of
seeking alternative partners and the opportunity cost of a foregone
present relationship.8
I would hope that these caricatured renditions of complex human
motivations will be found wanting. But nonetheless, they do capture
a part of the motivation behind why those with less to lose or whose
youth allows an unrealistically low estimation of the prospect of getting caught are those most likely to engage in unlawful conduct.
Similarly, that human relationships are fraught with complex emotions does not render irrelevant to the success of a relationship the
age of the individuals and the diminishing prospects of finding “Mr.
or Ms. Right” waiting at the next bus stop. Perhaps most significant,
the limitations of the law and economics approach to the full range of
factors in human decisionmaking should not diminish the tremendous intellectual energy unleashed by this inquiry into human motivation. The use of marginal utility to assess human events was as
bold a conceptual breakthrough as the advent of probabilistic reasoning a century earlier.9
As applied to law, the critical economic insight regarding litigated
cases comes from asking a simple question about the incentives that

6. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976) (applying an economic model to “Law and Politics” (Part 3), “Marriage, Fertility, and the Family” (Part 6), and other “Social Interactions” (Part 7)).
7. See id. at 47 (“[T]here is a function relating the number of offenses by any person
to his probability of conviction, to his punishment if convicted, and to other variables, such
as the income available to him in legal and other illegal activities . . . .”).
8. See id. at 212 (“The gain from marriage has to be balanced against the costs, including legal fees and the cost of searching for a mate, to determine whether marriage is
worthwhile.”).
9. For a compelling account of the role of statistical probabilities in reshaping intellectual thought after the Civil War, see LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 177-200
(2001).
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would lead people to actually seek a trial resolution in a case. If instead of assuming that the prospect of litigating through to trial and
appeal is random, and if instead we inquire as to the conditions under which rational parties might find themselves in an escalating
conflict over rights and wrongs, then the world of litigated dispute
resolution begins to look remarkably different.10 The key insight begins with a very simple model that assumes each party enters the
litigation process with an expected value attached to the claim of the
plaintiff. At its most simple, the model appears as follows:
EVP = P X A MINUS CP
In this simple model, EVP represents the expected value of the case
to the plaintiff. As set forth in this account, the plaintiff’s expectations are a function of her probability of success (P), the likely award
to be obtained (A), and the costs associated with prosecuting the
claim (Cp). This calculation can then also be expressed as the defendant’s expected loss from a plaintiff’s claim. Here the scaled down
version of the model appears as follows:
EVD = P X A PLUS CD
The defendant’s calculation is the mirror image of the plaintiff’s,
with one critical difference: the costs are added to the defendant’s
likely loss, whereas they are subtracted from the plaintiff’s likely recovery.11 Thus, these streamlined equations reflect the fact that the
costs associated with litigation are a joint loss to the parties and subtract from their joint welfare.
By combining these two equations, it is possible to isolate what is
termed a “settlement zone” in which two parties with convergent expectations of the likely award and the probability of the plaintiff pre-

10. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (“According to our model, the determinants of settlement and
litigation are solely economic, including the expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of success at trial,
and the direct costs of litigation and settlement.”).
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 523 (3d ed. 1986)
(“[S]ettlement negotiations will fail, and litigation ensue, only if the minimum price that
the plaintiff is willing to accept in compromise of his claim is greater than the maximum
price the defendant is willing to pay in satisfaction of that claim.”); see also Evans v. Jeff
D., 475 U.S. 717, 734 (1986) (“Most defendants are unlikely to settle unless the cost of the
predicted judgment, discounted by its probability, plus the transaction costs of further litigation, are greater than the cost of the settlement package.”).
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vailing are able to negotiate a mutually advantageous end to the litigation.12 This may be represented as follows:
SETTLEMENT ZONE CREATED BY CP PLUS CD,
WHEN PARTIES AGREE ON VALUES OF P AND A
If parties can agree on the likelihood of P (the probability of the
plaintiff winning) and A (the amount that will be awarded if she
wins), what they are really arguing about is how to divide up the
costs of litigation, CP and CD. Consider then a concrete application:
EXAMPLE: A dispute over $200,000; plaintiff has a 50% likelihood
of prevailing; each side will pay $25,000 to litigate through trial.
If each party would pay $25,000 to litigate a $200,000 claim that the
plaintiff has a 50 percent chance of winning, the gross expected value
of the claim not considering the costs of litigation would be $100,000.
Once those costs are taken into account, though, plaintiff stands to
gain only $75,000 if she wins, and defendant stands to lose $125,000
if he loses. Any settlement of more than $75,000 and less than
$125,000, if made before those costs of litigation are sacrificed,
makes each party better off.
For this model to work, however, there must be a convergence of
the estimated value of the case, which is a function of the likelihood
that the plaintiff will prevail and the prospective damage award if
she does indeed triumph.13 So if there is agreement on both the probability of the plaintiff prevailing and the likely size of the ensuing
award, cases should settle almost immediately, before much of the
pie is eaten away by the transaction costs associated with litigation.
There may of course be disagreement about how to apportion the savings from the portion of the pie that would otherwise have been lost.14
And some portion of cases may fritter away resources as the parties

12. See Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56-57 (1982) (“If
the plaintiff does decide to bring suit, it is assumed that he and the defendant will reach a
settlement if and only if there exists some settlement amount that both he and the defendant would prefer to going to trial.”).
13. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 112 (1994) (noting that under
an economic model, “as long as both sides make an identical estimate of the likely outcome
of the trial, the case should settle”) (footnote omitted).
14. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 523 (noting that the “larger the settlement range,
the more the parties will stand to gain from hard bargaining and the likelier (it may seem)
the parties are to end up litigating because they cannot agree how to divide the available
surplus”).
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posture to claim a greater willingness to go to trial.15 But life has a
way of removing from the gene pool individuals whose sense of sport
involves repeatedly playing chicken with oncoming cars. So too we
would expect parties whose sense of righteousness or greed or simply
amour-propre to be pushed to the margins if they indulge themselves
in costly attempts to squeeze out the last dime from mutually advantageous settlements.
What then if the parties’ estimates of probable success or likely
award do not converge? This turns out to be the arena for intervention of the American rules of procedure. The basic law and economics
insight is to claim that the source of divergence between the parties
must rest on incompatible assessments of either the facts or the law
governing a particular case.16 Since the parties (and society) are best
served by promoting quick settlements that conserve the joint resources of the parties, the rules of procedure should attempt to intercede to remove the sources of division. This is one way of understanding the simple mandate of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, which
states that the object of the Rules is to foster the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of disputes.17
Disagreement on the governing law is addressed relatively directly. To begin with, as a society we invest heavily in the creation of
the public good known as decisional law. We build courthouses, staff
them with respected leaders of the communities called judges, stock
them with bright clerks, and demand that their experiential wisdom
be reduced to written form. The resulting case law forms the heart of
the common law enterprise and is publicly available to counsel to inform their assessments of the strength of the claims put forward on
behalf of their clients.18 In addition, we allow for a relatively quick
reality check of the legal basis for a plaintiff’s claim through the
15. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 487-92 (1988) (describing how strategic behavior can frustrate settlement).
16. See Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s
Half-Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 585 (1995) (“Unstable and unpredictable
legal doctrine inhibits the convergence of the parties’ estimates of the case value, thus inhibiting settlement.”).
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[These rules] shall be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.”); see POSNER, supra note 11,
at 525 (“How do rules of procedure affect the settlement rate? . . . A full exchange of the information in the possession of the parties is likely to facilitate settlement by enabling each
party to form a more accurate, and generally therefore a more convergent, estimate of the
likely outcome of the case . . . .”).
18. See Robert G. Bone, Case Five: Complex Litigation and Prior Rulings Issues, 29
NEW ENG. L. REV. 703, 716 (1995) (“The larger the body of historical data about outcomes
in individual cases, the more likely it is that the parties’ estimates of settlement value will
converge on a reasonable figure.”); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 279, 296 (1973) (“The concept of legal precedent is in effect a means to provide stationarity over time to the probabilities and hence to increase the opportunities for
out of court agreements.”).
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Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. In some circumstances we may even
allow for interlocutory appeals, mandamus, or certification of a case
to a state appellate court, all for the purpose of providing an early
look at the governing legal principles.
Factual disagreements are more difficult. Here the true rendition
of the factual strength of a party’s claim lies not in the public domain
but almost certainly in the private knowledge of the litigants themselves.19 As long as the parties have private information about their
side of the case, the prospect of settlement may be significantly compromised.20 Take a simple case in which the standard of liability
turns in part on the state of mind of the defendant, such as with an
intentional tort or a claim of discrimination. Here the defendant will
likely have a much more informed sense of the prospects for proving
liability than would the plaintiff. On the other side of the equation,
the basic settlement model depends on convergent assessments of the
probable award should the plaintiff prevail. But here it is the plaintiff who is likely to have the better quality information as to the exact nature of the injuries suffered.21 Because such private information is not likely to be discernible in the public sphere, there is a
grave risk of inefficient impasses in the ability of parties to settle.
Here too the rules of procedure seek to intercede. Rather than
draw on a body of knowledge that is maintained in the public domain, as with published decisional law, the combined effects of notice
pleading and liberal discovery serve to create a limited public domain
of shared information between the parties. The scope of discovery is
the single most distinctive feature of American procedure and its
scope and cost not only draw attention but also typically shock foreign litigants who find themselves in American courts.22 But under
19. Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of
Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 323 (1999) (“Asymmetric information models, also based on divergent expectations by the parties, allow party estimates of outcome
to differ not based on party optimism but based instead on information held by only one
party (asymmetric information), so that one side has a truer estimate of the likely outcome
at trial.”).
20. See Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias
in Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. ROUNDTABLE 75, 81 (1993) (arguing that divergent expectations
“based on differences in information rather than opinion” account for trials).
21. See Robert H. Gertner & Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 87, 89 (1995) (“Consider a typical tort claim. The plaintiff may have better information about the extent of damages because the effect of the injury may be difficult for another party to observe. A defendant may have better information about liability because he
knows his level of care.”); Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of Litigation: A Critical Retrospective, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13, 16 (Larry Kramer ed., 1996) (noting
that in tort cases plaintiff usually has better information as to the magnitude of his damages).
22. See John H. Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial Application of the United
States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 355 (1983) (“Foreign discovery procedures
are generally narrowly tailored to issues directly involved in the litigation. By contrast,
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the economic model of litigation, the costs of discovery serve two important functions. First, the fact that parties face significant costs in
the litigation process expands the potential settlement zone and creates a greater possibility of mutually advantageous settlement, even
if the parties do not have perfectly matched assessments of the likely
prospects were the case to go to trial. More significantly, the costs of
discovery are justified to the extent that they bring the parties’ assessments of the case into line at some point prior to trial. Under this
approach, discovery not only allows for a trial to be “on the merits” if
the parties are unable to settle, but the investment in mutually
shared information makes settlement much more likely.23 Once the
parties have discovered all the information relevant to the claims
and defenses in the case, to use the language of Rule 26, and once
they have read from the same decisional law and tested the application of the law through motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment, there is no reason to believe that the parties should not
settle. And, indeed, our experience confirms that parties do settle in
droves, including the famous settlement on the courthouse steps.
The next step in this analysis will be to question the assumptions
made by the law and economics model as to how people actually behave under conditions of stress and uncertainty.24 But for the moment there remains a critical question for the law and economics approach: why then do any cases go to trial once the lawyers have
tested the law and discovered the facts? The economic model gives
two answers. First, there is the possibility of parties just getting it
wrong. Simply because we provide all the tools necessary to resolve
the dispute does not mean that some litigants just won’t get the hint.
In a world full of claims that Elvis still lives, it would be sheer folly
to suppose that any system that engages masses of people will be free
from error. Second, and perhaps more significantly, there are always
new areas of law, new claims, new conceptions of rights and duties. It
may be that the pretrial system has given the parties all the tools
more liberal American discovery procedures permit inquiry into a wide range of matters
that may never receive the direct attention of a foreign court.”).
23. Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of
Redemption, 52 VAND. L. REV. 599, 632-33 (1999) (“Discovery proceedings encourage settlements in a number of ways. First, by facilitating the exchange of information, they reduce the informational asymmetries that may block negotiations. Second, the prospect of
costly and time-consuming discovery may encourage the parties to settle.”); Robert B. Wilson, Strategic and Informational Barriers to Negotiation, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 108, 114 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (“Discovery procedures . . . contribute to an equalized evidentiary basis for the trial, and before the trial they can narrow
the informational gap and promote settlements; even the prospect of costly discovery can
encourage early settlement.”).
24. For a collection of the leading early studies of decisional processes under conditions of uncertainty, see JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY].
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necessary to mutually assess the facts and to evaluate the decisional
law as it stands. But it may still be the case that parties diverge in
their estimations of likely trial outcomes because the law is unsettled
in the particular domain in which their dispute arose.
Thus, there are two potential explanations for cases going to trial.
The first is mistake and the second is uncertainty in the state of the
law.25 As a result, parties who invest of themselves in providing fodder for the aspiring generations of law students do so either because
they are foolish or because they have the misfortune to find themselves in an area where others have not sufficiently tread in the past.
As to the former, well, there is not much we can do except be bemused as we read of their disputes. As to the latter, their decision to
pursue the case and create the public good of decisional law turns out
not to be a selfless act but the product of seeking a just solution in an
area where society could not provide enough certainty. But in either
case, the methodology of the system of civil procedure stands vindicated as trying to protect individuals from their own folly or providing as much certainty as possible in the assertion of their legal
rights.
One final point should be made about this conception of the litigation process. Under either explanation for why parties might actually
go to trial, there is no reason to believe that the cases that actually
do get litigated should favor one or the other side. If parties simply
make mistakes, or if the law is uncertain, then the likely winner at
trial could as easily be the plaintiff as the defendant. In other words,
the selection of cases for trial should be random as between the parties. This observation was formulated by Professors George Priest
and Benjamin Klein, in what is known as the Priest-Klein hypothesis. If indeed the sources of trial are either mistake or uncertainty in
the law, then Priest-Klein would predict that there would be no systematic bias to cases that do go to trial and that plaintiffs and defendants should each win about half of all litigated cases.26 Early empirical attempts to assess this hypothesis were generally confirmatory, although some subsequent analyses introduce complexity depending on the repeat quality of the defendant, the presence of an insurer, and a host of other strategic variables.27 But as a general mat25. See Richard B. Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in
Administrative Regulation, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 655, 662 (“The more certain the law—the
less the variance in expected outcomes—the more likely the parties will predict the same
outcome from litigation, and the less likely that litigation will occur because of differences
in predicted outcomes.”).
26. Priest & Klein, supra note 10, at 4-5.
27. See Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 11
(2000) (“The relatively high general tort rates are quite consistent with the predictions of
Priest and Klein’s fifty percent hypothesis, although the low product liability plaintiff win
rates are suspicious and evidence that strategic litigation may be transpiring.”) (footnote
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ter, the basic insight that litigated cases tend to split between the
parties has held up fairly well.28
II. DO LITIGANTS BEHAVE AS THE ECONOMIC MODEL
WOULD PREDICT?
A. The World of Human Complexity
If proven, the Priest-Klein hypothesis may confirm that the parties who get to trial are a random distribution from among the world
of litigants. The hypothesis may further confirm our sense that we
have designed a pretty good system for letting all but the foolish and
the trailblazers resolve their disputes prior to trial. And the hypothesis may even confirm an intuition that the right cases are basically
the ones going to trial. But the economic model and its confirmatory
hypothesis cannot assure us that the process of selecting out cases
prior to trial is an efficient one. It may be that the selection of cases
for trial works pretty well, but only at a tremendous cost to all settling litigants—costs that end up being borne by the settling parties
and by society as a deadweight loss.
To conclude that parties are being helped to settle in an efficient
manner, we need to assume that they will integrate the shared
knowledge of the facts and the law in such a way as to further their
achievement of shared assessments of the case. In other words, we
need to have a behavioral theory of how parties make decisions in
conditions of uncertainty as they go about the process of acquiring
the costly information about the relevant law and facts through the
litigation system. For the law and economics model to fully hold, we
must have confidence that mutually shared information will result in
parties reassessing their positions in light of the new information.
We must further assume that they will integrate the new information in parallel manner so that their assessments of the value of settlement actually converge. In short, we need a behavioral theory of
objective reevaluation of information in a cold, dispassionate fashion.
For if this were not to be the case, if information were not integrated
in such a way as to permit a dispassionate reassessment of the position of the parties, our confidence in the utility and the efficiency of
the tremendous costs associated with pretrial process would be severely shaken.

omitted); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319 (1991).
28. Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations
Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451, 452 (1998) (“Considerable evidence supports
the main prediction of the DE model, Priest and Klein’s 50 percent rule, that as the fraction of cases going to trial approaches zero, the plaintiff win rate at trial approaches 50
percent.”)
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Unfortunately, there is every reason to question this behavioral
account of how litigants respond to information.29 To begin with, the
law and economics model failed to take robust account of the more
nuanced account of strategic behavior that emerged from game theory.30 Here the challenge lay in identifying the mechanisms through
which information asymmetries between the parties could be exploited in ways that undermined the simple assumption of converging expectations. Whereas the early law and economics approach saw
the litigation process as a mechanism to overcome asymmetries in information, more sophisticated game theoretic approaches would ask
whether the existing asymmetries would be strategically exploited by
the better-situated parties. I will not attempt to address the broad
range of strategic complications here. Rather, I wish to direct my
concern to the behavioral assumptions of the law and economics
model more directly. Here I turn to an increasing body of social science evidence of decisionmaking under conditions of uncertainty, to
draw on the title of the pathbreaking work by Amos Tversky and
Daniel Khaneman and their behavioralist collaborators.31 The critical
insight in this work is that there are a number of robust decisional
heuristics that impede the smooth reassessments of information
called for in the economic model and that lay at the heart of the presumed efficiency of the modern procedural devices.32 I will examine a
couple of these to suggest where the next generation of law and economics work is heading and the types of challenges that will inform
the coming scholarly assessment of the processes of litigation.
To be clear, the concern here is not over the benefits of liberal
pleading and court-supervised discovery compared to some more
formalized common law pleading regimes from days gone by. The
concern is over the assumption of how parties will respond to the new
regime. To go back to the work of Gary Becker, the challenge is to the
underlying assumption of how people integrate information. For
Becker, the account is one of people acting as rational centralprocessing units: “[T]he economic approach does not assume that decisions units are necessarily conscious of their efforts to maximize or
can verbalize or otherwise describe in an informative way reasons for
29. For a good summary of this critique, see Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New Legal
Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279 (2001).
30. See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (discussing deficiencies in the law and economics model
and offering “an approach to economic analysis of law that is informed by a more accurate
conception of choice, one that reflects a better understanding of human behavior and its
wellsprings”).
31. JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 24.
32. See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1729, 1732-33 (1998). For a comprehensive survey of these heuristics, see
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1075-1102 (2000).
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the systematic patterns in their behavior. Thus it is consistent with
the emphasis on the subconscious in modern psychology . . . .”33 These
decision units (a.k.a. “people”) are assumed to have internalized a rational calculus deep in their subconscious. But rather than posit the
truth of that, as did Becker and by extension the first generation of
law and economics scholarship, this is an empirical claim that may
be tested and challenged.
Looking back at Becker’s claims a quarter century later, we have
every reason to be skeptical that they can hold up. We know, for example, that there is a long litany of psychological evidence on the
heuristics and biases in human reasoning.34 We know with a fair degree of certainty that people individually and even aggregated
through market transactions simply do not see the world through the
lenses offered up by the expected-value economic calculus.35 We can
look at some of the more well-established models to see how far we
have moved since Becker would have attributed his insights to the
core of the human psyche.
For example, we know that contrary to what economists would tell
us, people value losses more than gains and that they will invest
more heavily in seeking to avoid a loss than realize a gain, even of
equal value.36 Perhaps as a consequence, people value what they
have over what they may aspire to have. This is known as the endowment effect37 and is a robust effect, even if the goods are of equal
value. We also see the real world applications of these effects. Thus,
people will refuse to sell a possession for a fixed amount of money
even if they would not buy another for the same amount of money.38
Also, people tend to hold losing stocks too long and sell winners too
quickly, and are reluctant to sell their houses in a declining market,

33. BECKER, supra note 6, at 7 (footnote omitted).
34. See, e.g., Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Mark Kelman,
Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 24, at 3-20 [hereinafter
Tversky & Kahneman, Uncertainty].
35. See Jolls et al., supra note 30, at 1477-85.
36. This is the critical insight of the prospect theory work of Kahneman and Tversky.
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 268-69 (1979).
37. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect
and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1341-46 (1990); George Loewenstein &
Samuel Issacharoff, Source Dependence in the Valuation of Objects, 7 J. BEHAV.
DECISIONMAKING 157 (1994).
38. See Jolls et al., supra note 30, at 1482 (offering, as example, that individuals
would not buy a Super Bowl ticket they held for $1000, but they would also refuse to sell at
that price).
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seeking to avoid taking a loss.39 Similarly, we know that individuals
play the lottery, which clearly is irrational behavior in itself, and
that they are loathe to sell a one dollar lottery ticket already in their
possession even if offered a premium over the face value of the ticket,
because it could be a winner! And even on the old Monty Hall game
show, Let’s Make a Deal, participants were typically reluctant to
switch the door they initially picked (so as to avoid the dread feeling
of regret should their initial choice have been correct), despite the
fact that the structure of the game made accepting the offer to switch
a significantly better strategy.
We also know that people integrate information oddly by responding to high salience cues rather than more circumscribed statistical
inferences.40 As a result, flood insurance sells quickly after a high
profile, distant flood, as does earthquake insurance after a distant
tremor. We know that people pour good money after bad, hoping to
salvage investments gone sour, despite repeated admonitions from
economists to disregard sunk costs in making investment decisions.41
While we may continue to debate the magnitude of these peculiar
effects and the consequences of this type of decisionmaking,42 there is
little doubt about their existence. The important question is not to
label these as being rational or otherwise. We live in a world so
awash in information and data as to leave us incapacitated were we
not to have some form of shorthand methods to conduct our lives. Attention to our holdings, aversion to losses, and awareness of significant events that imprint themselves on our consciousness are all
mechanisms that allow us to survive in an increasingly complex
world. Just as the eye evolved to focus on the salient effects of motion
and change, so too we developed heuristics for capturing information
that helps us deal with the problems of uncertainty. These heuristics
are indispensable for ordering our lives. But as the effects described
above indicate, they can distort our behaviors in ways that lawyers
should be aware of.

39. Issacharoff, supra note 32, at 1736 n.24. See generally RICHARD H. THALER,
QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 11-13, 148-49 (1991) (providing examples of individuals’ inability to disregard sunk costs in making market-related decisions).
40. This is often referred to as the “availability heuristic.” See Jolls et al., supra note
30, at 1519; Tversky & Kahneman, Uncertainty, supra note 34, at 11.
41. See THALER, supra note 39, at 11-13, 148-49.
42. Robert E. Scott, for one, has argued that many of the models and studies described in this Article are flawed. See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of
Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1639-46 (2000).
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B. Examples in the Domain of Law
1. Following the Cues
Some examples should help us to understand the implications of
behavioral insights for the legal system. The easiest to begin with is
the problem of “framing”—the effect that presenting the same information as a matter of gains or losses has on the valuation. A fine
example is presented in a study by Professors McCaffery, Kahneman,
and Spitzer, which they describe as a problem of “Framing the
Jury.”43 In this experiment, the authors asked individual subjects in
an experimental setting to assume the role of jurors in a personal injury trial in which, following a determination of liability, an award
had to be rendered for harms that consisted of extreme stiffness in
the upper back and neck coupled with intermittent severe migraine
headaches.44 The subjects were all given identical information and an
identical scale of possible awards to choose from.45 The only difference between the two sets of subjects in the experiment was in the
presentation of the question to be answered.46 One group was asked
how much should be awarded to make whole the victim of the accident.47 The second group was asked how much they would have to be
paid to accept the harm suffered by the victim.48
As should be evident, the answer to the two questions should be
the same. If an individual were truly made whole, then that individual should be indifferent as to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the
accident. She will have been fully compensated for whatever harms
she may have suffered and should therefore be in the same position
whether or not the accident had occurred. The only difference in asking the question in one or another way is to pose the inquiry as
backward-looking (ex post relief) or as forward-looking (ex ante
valuation of the harm). In either case, the value should be the same.
Perhaps the values should be the same, but our intuition tells us that
they are not. In many states, this intuition takes the form of a prohibition on lawyers asking jurors what they would accept to have the harm
occur to them, a manifestation of the commonly observed disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay that is such a persistent bane to more formally inclined economists. True to form, this is
precisely what the study by McCaffery and his collaborators found.49

43. Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and
Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
44. Id. at 1355-56.
45. Id. at 1357.
46. Id. at 1355-57.
47. Id. at 1356.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1357-58.
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INJURY:
Three Years of Extreme Stiffness
in Back and Neck, and Migraines
DAMAGES:
Make Whole: $290,000
Accept to Have Occur: $527,500
When asked to make the victim whole, the subject jurors awarded an
average of $290,000.50 But when asked what they would have accepted ahead of time to suffer the victim’s fate, the award jumped to
$527,500.51 The disparity from the mere framing of the question was
almost 2-to-1.
Presentation of these experimental results is often met with skepticism. There must be something wrong with the pool from which
subjects are drawn to allow such marked effects from how a question
is framed. Such skepticism may be healthy, but I would hesitate to
be so quickly dismissive of the results. By way of confirmation, I took
the liberty of distributing some sample questions among several
hundred undoubtedly intelligent, rational, and sophisticated participants who should be expected to see through such cant: first-year law
students at Florida State.
To enlist the assistance of this admirable group, I distributed a
question that asked students here to guess the population of Turkey.
I did this by giving each student a questionnaire that gave an estimate of the population of Turkey, asked whether the student thought
the estimate was true or false, asked the student to give a percentage
estimate of how certain she was of her answer, and finally asked the
student to give her own best estimate of what the actual population
of Turkey might be. The only difference in the questions asked came
with the initial population estimate: one-half of the students received
a questionnaire that estimated the population at 34 million; the
other half received a questionnaire with an estimate of 106 million.52
The interesting question is whether the final estimate of the two
groups should be any different. Any rational calculus should tell us
that the two groups should converge in their final estimates. Since
the distribution of the questionnaires was random within the classes,
50. Id. at 1372-73.
51. Id.
52. This is a variant on the initial studies of the anchoring effect done by Tversky and
Kahneman. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1128 (1974).
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any actual knowledge of Turkey would likely be distributed randomly
between the two groups. Similarly, any errors would also be likely to
be randomly distributed. The only difference would come with the
unverified and unsubstantiated number at the top of the questionnaire, something that shrewd and skeptical law students would
quickly disregard as having no bearing on their informed judgments.
Or so it would seem. As with the prospective jurors in the McCaffery
study, the FSU students took their cues from the way the information was presented. The average estimate of the actual population of
Turkey by those whose baseline was 34 million turned out to be 32.9
million. By contrast, the group whose baseline was 106 million
turned in average estimates of 77.4 million. Again a disparity of a little over 2-to-1 based solely on the way a question was asked.
2. Being Led Astray
Other studies reveal just how powerful the framing effects are in
overcoming logical structures in integrating information. For example, a study by Amos Tversky, Mark Kelman, and Yuval Rottenstreich53 asked experimental subjects to figure out the appropriate
remedy for an individual whose sense of peace and solitude had been
disrupted by the sudden arrival of a loud weekend nightclub as a
neighbor.54 One set of subjects were presented with two choices: a
payment that included weekend lodging to get away from the noise
or an injunction to stop the high decibel activity.55 Of course you will
recognize this example as the familiar Coasean exchange from which
emerges an assumption that, in the absence of transaction costs, parties will bargain to a mutually advantageous allocation of resources.56
The twist in this experiment was to provide a second set of subjects
with three rather than two options. Instead of allowing only a weekend lodging or an order diminishing the sound level, the second set of
subjects were presented with a third option of a clearly inferior set of
weekend choices for the afflicted neighbor, including free admission
to the very sort of nightclub he sought to escape.57
Among the group presented with two options, the participants
split roughly in half.58 A total of fifty-three percent chose the compelled decrease in sound and forty-seven percent accepted the alter-

53. Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 287 (1996).
54. Id. at 299.
55. Id. at 299-300.
56. The original work is R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960).
57. Kelman et al., supra note 53, at 299-300.
58. Id. at 300.
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native weekend lodging arrangements.59 If this roughly even division
of choice were driven by the comparability of the two options, then
the addition of a third inferior option should have no bearing on the
results for the group of subjects presented with three options. Among
the second set of subjects, everyone recognized that the inferior
weekend arrangements were clearly inferior. No subject chose the inferior weekend arrangement as the preferred outcome. So, in effect,
the second set was choosing among the same two options as the first,
save for the introduction of an undesirable, and hence irrelevant, bad
choice. The results were markedly different. Among the second set of
subjects, seventy-four percent chose the initial weekend lodging option, while only twenty-six percent chose the diminution of sound
from the offending nightclub.60 Clearly, the presentation of two lodging options framed the subjects’ approach to the question, even if in
fact they were still choosing between the same two options as the
first set.
Again, it is possible to detect the murmurs of skepticism arising
from the audience. From where do these subjects come? Are they idiots? Dim-witted? Drunk? Well, these are fair questions and require
that we compare these subjects to a group whose intellectual pedigree is beyond reproach. Of course, I refer again to the first-year
class of FSU law students. I decided to test the ability of this group
to make the most logical of assessments of probability to see if the
presentation of factual information would cloud their judgment as it
clearly did in the study by Kelman and his collaborators.
I begin by presenting a very simple logical construct: the probability of two events both occurring can never be greater than the probability of either one of them occurring independently. This is simply
the proposition that the conjunctive can never be more probable than
the disjunctive: [A and B] can never be more likely than [A] or [B]. If
two events have to happen, they can never be more likely to occur together than either one standing alone. So, if you had to bet on what
are the chances of say the Texas Rangers or the Pittsburgh Pirates
getting to the World Series, your odds would be better if you had to
59. Id.
Percent Choosing
Weekend Lodging

Percent Choosing
Inferior Weekend
Lodging

Percent Choosing
Sound Decrease

N

Two-Option Group

47

...

53

32

Three-Option Group

74

0

26

31

60. Id. at 299-300.
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guess only that one of them would make it as opposed to guessing
that they would both have to make it. No matter which you pick, you
cannot improve your odds by picking both. The concept is simple
enough and should be clear to all.61
But now suppose we put this proposition to the test in a richer factual context. To do this, I turn to the famous pair of examples developed
by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman: Linda, the 31 year old, bright
outspoken former philosophy student and student activist; and Bill, the
34 year old, intelligent but unimaginative and lifeless former math major who showed little proclivity for social studies and the humanities.62
For each of them, there is a series of eight options in which the subjects,
here the FSU students, are asked to rank order what most likely characterizes the activities of Linda63 and Bill64 today. There are three
choices that are of interest to us. For Linda, these are that she is active
in the feminist movement, that she is a bank teller, or that she is a bank
teller and is active in the feminist movement. For Bill, the choices of in-

61. If the question asks to assess the relative probabilities of the following:
1) A (alone)
2) B (alone)
3) A plus B
The answer cannot be that (3) is more probable. The conjunctive can never be more likely
than the disjunctive.
62. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 24, at 84-93 [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness]. For additional examples of what is termed the “representativeness heuristic,” see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 32, at 1086.
63. Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.
Please rank the following statements by their probability, using 1 for the most probable
and 8 for the least probable.
______Linda is a teacher in elementary school.
______Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes.
______Linda is active in the feminist movement.
______Linda is a psychiatric social worker.
______Linda is a member of the League of Women Voters.
______Linda is a bank teller.
______Linda is an insurance salesperson.
______Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
64. Bill is thirty-four years old. He is intelligent but unimaginative, compulsive, and generally
lifeless. In school, he was strong in mathematics but weak in social studies and the humanities.
Please rank the following statements by their probability, using 1 for the most probable
and 8 for the least probable.
______Bill is a physician who plays poker for a hobby.
______Bill is an architect.
______Bill is an accountant.
______Bill plays jazz for a hobby.
______Bill surfs for a hobby.
______Bill is a reporter.
______Bill is an accountant who plays jazz for a hobby.
______Bill climbs mountains for a hobby.
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terest are that he is an accountant, that he plays jazz for a hobby, or
that he is an accountant who plays jazz for a hobby.
It should be clear that these choices are nothing more than a
factually rich rendition of the logical propositions set forth earlier.
It may be that Linda is a bank teller, and it may be that she is active in the feminist movement, but it cannot be that her being a
bank teller and active in the feminist movement is the likelier
choice than either of the two standing alone. Similarly, it may be
that Bill is an accountant, and it may be (however unlikely) that
he plays jazz for a hobby, but it cannot be more probable that he is
an accountant and plays jazz for a hobby than either one of those
choices standing alone.
Yet, the students of FSU, joining their brethren in numerous
experimental settings,65 would beg to differ. Applying a simple ordinal ranking to the choices, Linda is selected as being currently
active in the feminist movement on average 2.22 among the 8
choices. The choice of her being a bank teller ranks at 6.37 out of
the 8 choices. But Linda as a bank teller who is active in the feminist movement comes in at 5.1, significantly more likely, in the
view of hundreds of FSU students, than that she would be a bank
teller with no additional requirement.66
Bill is treated no differently. The students here find it overwhelmingly likely that Bill is an accountant, with that choice receiving a scaled score of 1.68 (how cruel these students can be
toward fraternal professions). By contrast, the prospect of Bill
playing jazz for a hobby is deemed unlikely, receiving a score of
5.51. But the prospect of Bill being an accountant who plays jazz
for a hobby receives a score of 4.0, as if the taint of being an ac-

65. Tversky & Kahneman, Representativeness, supra note 62, at 92-96.
66.
LINDA

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

A) TEACHER

7

7

11

23

36

26

16

11

B) BOOKSTORE/
YOGA

19

15

24

35

16

5

9

12

C) FEMINIST

56

40

22

5

7

3

2

2

D) PSYCHIATRIC

19

24

28

24

24

11

3

3

E) LEAGUE

26

40

28

18

13

4

3

3

F) BANK TELLER

4

2

6

3

8

26

61

25

G) INSURANCE

3

4

3

5

4

16

26

76

H) BANK TELLER/
FEMINIST

3

4

14

25

25

44

16

5
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countant could overcome the apparent absence of sufficient creativity to play jazz.67
3. Believing in Yourself
The examples I have just reviewed show just how central are our established frameworks for integrating information—what behavioral economists term our decisional heuristics. Even though there is no reason to
trust an unsubstantiated statement on the population of Turkey and even
though we should all acknowledge as a formal matter that two events occurring together can never be more probable than one occurring alone,
nonetheless we can easily fall prey to the way we look for cues to guide our
behavior. These experimental observations do challenge the assumption of
the formal economic model that information can be integrated in a cold,
rational fashion. Whatever the full psychological pathways by which these
decisions are made, there are evident departures from the predicted
mechanisms for making decisions in light of new information.
Nonetheless, these observed behaviors alone are not enough to
disrupt our confidence in the basic model of dispute resolution under
American civil procedure. Whatever missteps may ensue appear to be
random. There may be some efficiency losses when litigants fail to integrate information properly, but there is no systemic bias. The mistakes
appear as likely as not to cancel each other out.
The same cannot be said for another set of studies that test whether
the mistaken integration of information is truly random. I refer here to a
series of studies undertaken by Linda Babcock, Colin Camerer, George
Loewenstein, and me, which sought to assess a phenomenon we termed
“self-serving bias.”68 In these studies subjects were presented with a rich
67.
BILL

1

2

3

4

A) PHYSICIAN

16

37

36

27

9

B) ARCHITECT

7

36

31

20

16

C) ACCOUNTANT

5

6

7

8

7

3

11

22

8

6

104

17

8

4

2

5

1

2

D) JAZZ

0

7

12

16

33

34

24

20

E) SURFER

5

4

5

5

13

26

42

43

F) REPORTER

3

14

14

27

30

19

16

19

G) ACCOUNTANT/
JAZZ

5

18

28

31

24

11

18

3

H) MOUNTAIN
CLIMBER

2

6

10

11

19

19

34

38

68. Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON.
REV. 1337 (1995) [hereinafter Babcock et al., Biased Judgments]; Linda Babcock et al.,
Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 913, 915-23
(1997) [hereinafter Babcock et al., Debiasing Litigation]; George Loewenstein et al., SelfServing Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993).
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set of factual materials taken from an actual case involving a motor vehicle accident. The materials included deposition excerpts, maps of the accident sites, medical records, and witness statements. The key was that
they were provided identical information and were informed of this and
further told that there was no other private information available. The
subjects were then placed in negotiations settings by pairs. One of the
subjects was assigned the role of plaintiff, and the other was the defendant. The defendant was given a sum of money and the parties were instructed that they could settle as to the amount or else the matter would
be assigned to a judge, and that they would be taxed the costs of the litigation. Every inducement was toward settlement.
These studies are somewhat extensive and cannot be fully represented in the course of a single lecture. But the key point can be readily
summarized. If errors were random, there should be no particular bias
to how the parties integrated information. Following the methodology of
the Priest-Klein hypothesis, errors should wash out and the overall efficiency of the process should be maintained. Unfortunately, the results
do not bear this out. Rather than finding a random distribution of error,
we find a persistent tendency to integrate new information in a selfserving fashion.69 Rather than bringing parties together, mutually
shared common information can provide a fertile environment for disagreement and inefficient impasses.70
Let me focus on just a subset of the findings that should illustrate
the point, as set forth in the following table:
1

FAIR SETTLEMENT

PLAINTIFF
$37,028

DEFENDANT
$19,318

2

DIFFERENCE IN ESTIMATES
OF FAIR SETTLEMENT

SETTLED
$11,941

DID NOT SETTLE
$33,915

3

DIFFERENCE IN FAIR
S ETTLEMENT V ALUE
ESTIMATES OF PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT

KNEW ROLES
$19,756

DID NOT KNOW
ROLES
-$6,275

4

SETTLEMENT RATE

KNEW ROLES
0.72

DID NOT KNOW
ROLES
0.94

69. See Issacharoff, supra note 32, at 1738; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 32, at 1093.
70. See Babcock et al., Biased Judgments, supra note 68, at 1342; Loewenstein et al.,
supra note 68, at 157-59.
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The first line shows the challenge to the hypothesized efficient convergence on mutually shared information. In this scenario, subjects
were given the exact same information and asked to assess what a
fair value of the plaintiff’s claim would be. There was no difference
between the subject populations save that in each experimental setting the subjects were told that one was the plaintiff who was seeking some of the money given at the outset to the defendant and the
other was the defendant who was in possession of the money. If parties could converge on the value of the claim, there should be no difference between the groups. Even if individuals made errors in
judgment, so long as there was no systematic bias, the effect should
wash out in the comparative aggregate valuations. As line 1 shows,
however, the differences were hardly random. Plaintiffs valued the
claim almost twice as greatly as did defendants. Out of a maximum
value of $100,000, the plaintiffs thought the claim was worth roughly
$37,000 to the defendants’ $19,000.
That the parties differed in the valuation of identical sets of information is significant, but more significant is the impact that the
differences in valuation have on the settlement prospects of the parties. As line 2 shows, the difference in valuation is directly correlated
to the ability to settle. Among the subject pairs who settled, the difference between plaintiff and defendant valuations was $12,000,
while the nonsettling pairs differed in their valuations by almost
$34,000. Line 3 establishes that the relation between the role of the
parties and the valuations is not merely a matter of correlation but of
causation. In a subsequent experiment, subjects were divided between those pairs who gave their estimates of fair value after being
assigned a role as plaintiff and defendant and those who were not assigned a role until after they had formed an opinion of the value of
the case. Not surprisingly, there is no systematic bias to the differences in value estimates in the group that did not have their roles
assigned. Line 4 further establishes that the group that did not have
roles assigned was able to settle more successfully than the groups
whose estimations were infected by what we term self-serving bias in
the integration of information. Despite strong incentives to settle, including punishing ongoing litigation by penalizing the subjects for
each period of delay in negotiations, more than a quarter of the subject litigants were unable to settle despite basing their estimations
on exactly convergent sets of information.
CONCLUSION
The first generation of law and economics insights helped to systematize the understanding of law and to examine critically the regulatory ambitions of the law. The next generation of this scholarship
poses a direct challenge to the law. The challenge is to understand
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the behavioral dynamics that drive the real people we encounter in
our profession. If our predictions make use of the narrow incentive
structure admitted by law and economics, they will often fail. This
impoverished model fails to capture a robust picture of human decisionmaking.
Our next challenge is to determine what use we can make of our
understanding of these phenomena. How do they apply within the legal system in general? Are the effects robust? Are they substantively
important? Do they suggest policy prescriptions?
Clearly we cannot remove from real world litigants knowledge of
whether they are plaintiffs or defendants; it is unlikely that parties
actually injured will readily be deprived of that knowledge. But there
are debiasing techniques that may prove useful71 in some circumstances, while there may be greater warrant for earlier judicial intervention in controlling the acceleration of discovery costs in others.
Nonetheless the challenge persists. The task is to adapt the system
of dispute resolution to the world in which real humans exist, imperfections and all. It is the task to which the law must turn to define its
success, as future disputants will engage our evolved but still evolving litigation system. Presumably, it is a system that may even catch
the attention of the 65 million inhabitants of Turkey.

71. See Babcock et al., Debiasing Litigation, supra note 68.

